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1. Introduction
In 1982, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.] held that non-art-icle III judges2 could not
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction vested in them under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. The decision has created a serious problem for Congress
by forcing it to restructure the bankruptcy courts; however, the ramifications
of Northern Pipeline extend far beyond the case's immediate impact on
* Mr. Rehel, who is currently serving as Law Secretary to Justice McNeilly
of the Delaware Supreme Court, wrote this essay while a 3rd year law
student at Villanova University. He acknowledges the assistance of
Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. in editing the final draft for publication.
(See p. 33).
1 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, joined
by three other Justices. Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice O'Connor
concurred separately. Justice White, joined by Justice Powell and the
Chief Justice dissented. For commentaries see Currie, Bankruptcy Judges
and the Independent Judiciary, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 441 (1983); King,
Aftermath of Northern Pipeline, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1983);
Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the Bankruptcy
Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 Geo. L.J. 297 (1981); Redish, L2e islative
Courts Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
Duke L.J. 197 (1983).
2 Section 1 of article III of the Constitution says,
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
(Footnote continued on next page.)
bankruptcy adjudication.3 Non-article III officers currently exercise
federal judicial power in several other contexts; after Northern Pipeline,
the constitutionality of their exercise of jurisdiction is in question.
Attention has particularly focused on adjudication of article III cases
by Magistrates and by administrative agencies. Although the Federal
Magistrates Act has thus far withstood attacks based on Northern Pipeline,
the constitutionality of administrative adjudication is not as certain.
This paper reviews the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline, emphasizing the analysis of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion,
and then applies this analysis to the Federal Magistrates Act. In
particular, attention will be given to decisions of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, holding delegation to Federal Magistrates constitutional. 4 The
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
U.S. Const. art Ill Section 1. Generally non-article III judges are
considered to be those adjudicators who do not have the life term and
fixed salary protections of article III. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
60, 61.
Bankruptcy Court Judges are appointed to office for a 14 year term by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 28 U.S.C. Sections
152, 153(a) (Supp. IV 1976). Bankruptcy Judges are subject to removal by
the judicial council of the circuit on account of "incompetency, miscon-
duct, neglect of duty or physical o r mental disability." 28 U.S.C.
Section 153(b) (Supp. IV 1976). In addition, salaries of bankruptcy
judges are subject to adjustment under the Federal Salary Act. 28 U.S.C.
Section 154 (Supp. IV 1976).
3 The Court has stayed the effect of its order until October 4, 1982, in
order to "afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy
courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication, without impairing
the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
The stay was extended until December 24, 1982, but on December 23, 1982 a
further extension was denied. 103 S. Ct. 662 (1982). The jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy courts has been extended until April 30, 1984 by Public
Law #98-249. A further extension of jurisdiction until May 25, 1984 is
awaiting Presidential approval.
4 See Wharton-Thomas v. U.S., 721 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1983); Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instrumedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Both Circuits have held the Federal Magistrates
Act constitutional, relying primarily upon the consent of the litigants
(Footnote continued on next page.)
paper then distinguishes administrative agency adjudication from adjudication
under the Federal Magistrates Act. Finally, the Northern Pipeline analysis
is applied to administrative adjudication and compulsory arbitration.
Arbitration provisions under the Railway Labor Act, 5 the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, Rodenticide Act,6 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act' will be discussed.
The paper concludes that under the Northern Pipeline analysis,
certain administrative agency adjudication and several compulsory arbitration
provisions unconstitutionally vest article III jurisdiction in non-article III
judicial officers. While trends toward alternative dispute resolution are
admirable and much needed,8 adjudication of common law disputes by non-
article III officers violates the doctrine of separation of powers and
deprives citizens of their constitutional right to a decision by an article III
judge. Northern Pipeline may be an impediment to the growth of alternative
dispute resolution, however it may also be the long awaited check on the
"headless fourth branch" of the federal government.9
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
which is obtained before a magistrate presides over a case. Other Circuits
have also held the Act constitutional. See Collins V. Foreman, No. 83-7938,
slip op. (2nd Cir. Feb. 22, 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, No. 83-1411,
slip op. (1st Cir. 1984).
5 45 U.S.C. Section 153 (1981).
6 7 U.S.C. Section 136a (1982).
7 29 U.S.C. Section 1401 (Supp. V 1981).
8 See Kritzer and Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative
Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Made, and Cost In The
American Arbitration Association and the Court, 8/1 The Just. Sys. J. 6
(1983); W. Burger, The Washington Post, January 25, 1982, p. 8. Chief
Justice Warren Burger's concern of the ability of the courts to handle
increasing litigation has been helpful to those who want to develop
alternative forums of dispute resolution.
9 S. Breyer & R. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 103,
104 (1979). The criticism was directed in particular at the independent
regulatory commissions, but experience teaches that agencies nominally
accountable to the President often enjoy considerable de facto autonomy.
Id.
II. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
1. Holding
In Northern Pipeline, the U.S. Supreme Court held the bankruptcy
court system unconstitutionally vested judicial power in non-article III
judges. 0 Although there are recognized exceptions to the article III
requirement that the judicial power of the United States be exercised in
article III courts, the Northern Pipeline Court held that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act did not fall within any such exception. 11
Northern sued Marathon Pipe Line to recover damages for an
alleged breach of contract.1 2  Justice Brennan explained that such a right
involved "the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined" and therefore a private right. 13 Since it was a "private right"
being adjudicated, the first exception allowing "public rights" to be
delegated to non-article III judges, could not save the Reform Act. The
Court examined the second exception allowing delegation of private rights
to adjuncts. 14 The adjunct exception requires the essential attributes of
judicial power to be retained in an article III court. 15 The Court found
that these attributes of judicial power were not retained by an article III
court; therefore, the Bankruptcy Reform Act was unconstitutional.
2. Analysis
Justice Brennan, distinguished between public and private rights,
reasoned that while public rights can be adjudicated by a non-article III
officer, private rights must be adjudicated by an article III court. 16
10 458 U.S. at 87.
11 Id. at 64-67. The three recognized exceptions which the Court looked at
were: 1) territorial courts, 2) courts-martial, and 3) courts that
adjudicate public rights. Id. The Court also later looked to the adjunct
exception, but found that this could not save the Reform Act. Id. at 86.
12 Id. at 56. Northern Pipeline also alleged misrepresentation, coercion,
and duress. Id.
13 Id. at 71, 72.
14 Id. at 77, see notes 23-32 and accompanying text infra.
15 Id. at 81.
16 Id. at 67-70. The Northern Pipeline Court cited to its recent reference
to the public-private right dichotomy in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 456 (1977). Id. at 67, 70.
In Atlas Roofing, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment did not prohibit
(Footnote continued on next page.)
Only tribunals which are adjunct to article III courts can constitutionally
adjudicate private rights.17 The Court analogized adjuncts to a jury or a
special master. 18
Public rights are those rights which arise "between the Govern-
ment and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions of the executive and legislative departments."
19
The presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceedin8 is
a necessary but not conclusive means of identifying a public right.2U Justice
Brennan explained that the justification for excluding public right adjudi-
cation from article Ill's mandatory core, is the principle of sovereign
immunity.21 Absent the consent of Congress, sovereign immunity protects the
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Congress from assigning adjudication of public rights to an administrative
forum with which a jury would be incompatible. 430 U.S. at 460. This
reference by the Court to Atlas Roofing has been criticized by at least
one commentator. See Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies
and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 197, 207 (1983).
Redish argues that Atlas Roofing itself was controversial since the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial had never been thought to turn
on a public-private rights distinction but on an analogy to common law
practice. Redish at 207. But Redish is so critical of the public-
private right dichotomy, he-fails to realize that the dichotomy itself
is based upon an analogy to common law practice. See Northern Pipeline at
69, n. 23 (citing to Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
18 How. 272, 284 (1856)). It is submitted common law private rights are
those rights which must be adjudicated by an article III court and which
entitles one to a trial by jury.
17 Id. at 80. Justice Brennan explained, "Congress' power to create
adjuncts and assign them limited adjudicatory functions is in no sense an
exception to Article III." Id. at 77. "Rather, such an assignment is
consistent with Article III, so long as 'the essential attributes of the
judicial power' are retained in the Article III court . . ." Id. Never-
theless, the creation of an adjunct is a mean by which a non-article III
officer may adjudicate some federal judicial power.
18 Id. at 77.
19 Id. at 67, 68.
20 Id. at 69 n. 23. The Court added that even with respect to matters
that arguably fall within the scope of the public rights doctrine, the
presumption is in favor of article III courts. Id.
21 Id. at 67. Sovereign immunity explains in part the doctrine of public
rights. Id. The public rights doctrine also "draws upon the principle of
separation of powers, and a historical understanding that certain pre-
rogatives were reserved to the political branches of government." Id.
government from suit. In giving consent, Congress may attach conditions
as it deems proper and can indeed require that the suits be brought in a
legislative court or agency specially created to consider them. 22 Thus,
public rights may be adjudicated at the determination of Congress, in
a non-article III tribunal.
On the other hand, "the liability of one to another under the
law as defined is a matter of private rights." 2 3 As an example of
adjudication of private rights, the Court noted Crowell v. Benson,24
which concerned the liability of an employer to his employee under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Justice Brennan
explains that disputes involving private rights must be adjudicated by
an independent article III court since private right disputes "lie at the
core of the historically recognized judicial power." 25
Two subclasses of private rights were identified by Justice
Brennan.26 The first are congressionally created private rights, and the
second are common law private rights. Both subclasses of private rights
are referrable to adjuncts of article III courts so long as the essential
attributes of judicial power are retained in an article III court.2 7
Congressionally created private rights require fewer attributes be retained
in an article III court than do common law private rights.2 8
22 Id. at 67, 68. For a critique of this rationale, see Redish, Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision,
1983 Duke L.J. 197, 213 (1983).
23 Id. at 69, 70.
24 285 U.S. 22 (1932), see notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text infra.
25 458 U.S. at 70.
26 Id. at 78, 79 & 83.
27 Id. at 77.
28 Id. at 81. The Court explains that Crowell does not support the
further proposition that Congress possesses the same degree of dis-
cretion in assigning traditional judicial power to adjuncts engaged in
the adjudication of rights not created by Congress. Id. The Court
upheld the adjudication of common law private rights in Raddatz, under
more scrutiny than it gave the delegation of congressionally created
private rights in Crowell. Id. at 82, 83. See note 32 and accompanying
text infra.
When a congressionally created private right is at issue, limited
attributes of judicial power can be delegated to an adjunct to adjudicate
such a right. 29 As illustrated by Crowell, these attributes include:
1. power to adjudicate a specialized subject matter;
2. channeled fact finding, and
3. power to issue a limited type of order.
In addition, the adjunct must be subjected to a standard of judicial
review less deferential than clearly erroneous, and it must need to
enforce its order in an article III court. 30
When a common law private right Is at issue, even less discretion
exists on the part of Congress to prescribe the manner of adjudication. 3 1
Justice Brennan indicated that decisions of adjuncts involving common law
private rights must be subject to de novo review by the district court. 32
3. Summary
Northern Pipeline establishes two exceptions to the article III
requirement that federal judicial power be exercised by article III courts.
First, public rights, which at a minimum require the government as a
party to the suit, may be delegated to non-article III tribunals. Secondly,
private rights may be delegated to adjuncts of article III courts so
long as the essential attributes of judicial power remain in an article III
court. 33 The extent to which the attributes must remain in the article III
court will depend on whether the private right is a congressionally created
private right or a common law private right.
29 Id. at 81. The rationale behind allowing an adjunct to adjudicate
congressionally created private rights is "that when Congress creates
a substantive federal right, it possesses substantial discretion to
prescribe the manner in which the right may be adjudicated -- including
the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed
by judges." Id.
30 Id. at 84, 85.
31 Id. at 81, see note 28 and accompanying text supra.
32 Id. at 79. In Raddatz, the Supreme Court upheld the 1978 Magistrates
Act, where the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendation were
subject to de novo review. Id. The Court stressed that under the
1978 Act, the authority to make an informed, final determination remains
with the judge. Id. at 81. The delegation of adjudication of common
law private rights was upheld in Raddatz since "the ultimate decision is
made by the district court. Id.
33 Although the Northern Pipeline Court notes that the adjudication by
an adjunct is not an exception to the article III requirement, it is a
meansby which a non-article III officer can exercise some federal judicial
power.
When congressionally created private rights are adjudicated by
adjuncts, attributes noted in Crowell may be delegated to the adjunct.
De novo review is required when an adjunct adjudicates common law private
rights.
III. Application to the Federal Magistrates Act
1. Introduction
The debate over the constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates
Act centers on the issue of whether essential attributes of judicial power
are retained in an article III court.3 4 Northern Pipeline requires de novo
review when common law private rights are adjudicated by an adjunct,
something other than de novo review has been accepted by the U.S. Courts
of Appeals that have considered the constitutionality of the Act.35
At issue is the 1979 addition of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c) which
allows a magistrate to conduct a civil trial involving common law private
rights, but does not provide for de novo review by a district judge. In
United States v. Raddatz,36 the Supreme Court upheld the 1978 Federal
Magistrates Act which had permitted district court judges to refer certain
pretrial motions to a magistrate for initial determination. In upholding
the Act, the Court observed that the magistrate's proposed findings were
subject to de novo review by the district court. 37 Without de novo review
34 Magistrates are non-article judges since they do not have life tenure
or salary protection. Federal Magistrates serve for eight year terms
and must retire at age seventy. 28 U.S.C. Section 631(d)(e) (Supp. V
1981). Magistrates may also be removed from office during a term for
incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental dis-
ability, and a sitting magistrate's office may be terminated if the
Judicial Conference decides that the office is no longer needed. 28
U.S.C. Section 631(1) (Supp. V 1981). The salaries of magistrates are
also not protected since they may be changed by the judicial conference
to further the expeditious administration of justice. 28 U.S.C.
Section 633(c) (Supp. V 1981). This salary adjustment, however, is
limited in that a magistrate's salary may be reduced during his term in
office only to what it was at the beginning of the term. Id.
35 See note 3 supra for a listing of the Courts of Appeals which have thus
far upheld the Federal Magistrates Act as constitutiional.
36 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
37 Id. at 676, 677, 681-683.
by the district court, the issue arises whether essential attributes of
judicial power are tetained in an article III court.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals thus far to consider the issue, have
held the Federal Magistrates Act constitutional. Courts have noted two
factors upon which the Act withstands constitutional challenges. These
factors are first, the consent of litigants, and secondly, the extensive
control over the magistrates by article III courts.3
8
2. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America
v. Instrumedix39
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America charged Instrumedix with
infringement of a patent. The parties consented to a trial before a
magistrate. The magistrate found the patent valid but not infringed;
both parties appealed directly to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The Court of Appeals, sua sponte raised the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act. 40 A panel of three judges
initially heard the appeal.
41
The panel held that the Magistrates Act unconstitutionally vested
non-article III officers with jurisdiction to exercise federal judicial
power. 4 2 Utilizing the Northern Pipeline analysis, the panel held that
magistrates were adjudicating common law private rights without the essential
attributes of judicial power remaining in an article III court.4 3 The panel
explained that magistrates make the ultimate decisions and enter final
judgments. The panel concluded that litigant consent could not waive the
jurisdictional requirement of article III. 
4
38 See Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 542, 544; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d 922, 930.
39 712 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1983) reh'g granted, op. withdrawn, 718 F.2d
971 (9th Cir. 1983). Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instrumedix,
725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
40 725 F.2d 537, 540.
41 712 F.2d 1305.
42 Id. at 1307.
43 Id. at 1310. The panel first explained that magistrates do not have
the article III protections of life tenure and fixed salary. Id. at
1309. The adjudication could not be upheld as adjudication of public
rights. Id. The Court then examined whether the adjudication could
be upheld under the adjunct exception. Id.- The panel concluded that
since the ultimate decision was made by the magistrate, not the
district court, the essential attributes of judicial power were not
retained in an article III court. Id. at 1310.
44 Id'. at 1312. The panel viewed the requirement of adjudication of common
law private rights by an article III court as a jurisdiction requirement,
which could not be waived by the litigants. Id.
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel and held
the Federal Magistrates Act constitutional. The court held that "in
light of the statutory precondition of voluntary litigant consent and the
provisions for the appointment and control of the magistrates by Article III
courts, the conduct of civil trials by Magistrates is constitutional."46
The court explained that the issue of separation of powers has
two components.4 7 "One axis reaches to the person affected by government
action and encompasses his or her relation to a constitutional branch;
the other axis runs from each government branch to the others to Insure
separation and independence in the constitutional structure."4 8  Both
components need to be satisfied to uphold the delegation of judicial
power.49
The first axis is the litigant's personal right to demand article III
adjudication of a civil suit.50 This personal right, like many other
rights, can be waived by the litigant. 5 1 The court explained that without
litigant consent the adjudication by a magistrate of private rights would
be unconstitutional.
45 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984). Although the court felt that the patent
issue may be a federally created right, the court reached the consti-
tutional issue of common law private rights since the issue would arise
in other civil cases. Id. at 541.
46 Id. at 540.
47 Id. at 541.
48 Id.
49 Id. Where a case is transferred from an article III court to a different
forum, both the rights of the parties and the relations between the
separate branches of government are Implicated. Id. at 541. A mandatory
provision for trial of an unrestricted class of civil cases by a
magistrate would violate the constitutional rights of the ligitants.
Id. at 542. The component of the separation of powers rule that
protects the integrity of the constitutional structure cannot be waived
by the parties. Id. at 544.
50 Id. at 541.
51 Id. The court explained that "authorities support the premise that
article III adjudication is, in part, a personal right of the litigant."
Id. (citing to Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)).
The court noted that the Supreme Court has allowed criminal defendants
to waive even fundamental rights. Id. at 543. The following rights
-Footnote continued on next page.)
The second axis concerns the doctrine of separation of powers.
52
The issue is whether there is an impairment of the performance of the
branch's essential role in the constitutional system. The court explained
that there is a potential for such an impairment when there is an erosion
of the central powers of the judiciary by permitting the delegation of
its authority.5 3 The court concluded that the Magistrates Act contained
sufficient protection against such erosion of judicial power.
The sufficient protections iPn the Magistrates Act evolve around
the extensive administrative control by article III courts over the magistrate
system.5 4 The court noted that an article III judge can cancel an order
of reference,55 and that the selection and retention of magistrates is the
responsibility of article III judges.5 6 The court concluded that these
factors provided protection comparable to de novo review.
5 7
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
may be waived:
the right to be free from self-incrimination, Garner v.
United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); the right to counsel,
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269
(1942); the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); the right to a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972); the right to a jury trial, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968); and even by
pleading guilty, the right to trial itself. See
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709,
1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Id. at 543.
52 Id. at 543, 544.
53 Id. at 544.
54 Id. at 544. "The statute invests the Article III judiciary with
e-xtensive administrative control over the management, composition, and
operations of the magistrate system." Id.
55 725 F.2d at 545 (citing to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)(
6 ).). The article III
court has authority to cancel an order of reference, sua sponte or on
application of the parties. Id.
56 Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. Section 631). Therefore, magistrates are not
d irectly dependent upon loyalty to offices in either of the political
branches. Id.
57 Id. at 546. The court concluded that both Section 636(c), the procedure
at issue in the case at bar; and Section 636(b), the issue of de novo
review upheld in U.S. v. Raddatz, have their own potential defects
and comparative advantages. Id.
3. Wharton-Thomas v. United States5 8
A suit seeking compensation for personal injuries allegedly
received in an automobile collision with a Postal Service vehicle was
brought against the United States under the Tort Claims Act.
59 With the
parties' consent, the case was tried before a federal magistrate. The
magistrate found for the plaintiff; the plaintiff appealed the award as
inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit raised the 6o
issue of the constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act sua sponte.
The cogrt distinguished Wharton-Thomas from Northern Pipeline and
U.S. v. Raddatz, 1 on the grounds of litigant consent. court reasoned
that the ultimate decisions must remain in a district court only when there
is no consent by the litigants to do otherwise.
6 3 The court explained that
what was being waived was not jurisdiction of the trial court but a particular
mode of trial or factfinder.
58 721 F.2d 922 C3rd Cir. 1983).
59 Id. at 923. The court noted that in such an action the delegation may
beconstitutional based upon the public rights exception. Id. at 930.
The court chose instead to decide the issue on the broader basis which
it did. Id. The court did so since in a companion case, Williams v.
Marsonelli, the public rights exception would not apply. Id.
It Is arguable whether the right being adjudicated in Wharton-Thomas
is a public right. The presence of the United States as a party to the
action is only one factor pointing to a public right. See notes 19-22
and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that the adJudication of
a personal injury suit is not an area traditionally thought to be
within the prerogative of the executive branch. Therefore, the right
being adjudicated here would seem to be better classified as a common
law private right.
60 Id. at 923. Plaintiff took a direct appeal to the magistrate's judgment,
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
61 447 U.S. 667 (1980). For a discussion of U.S. v. Raddatz, see note 36
and accompanying text supra.
62 721 F.2d at 928.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 926, 927.
The court went on to explain that magistrates function as an
integral part of the district court. Magistrates are appointed and sub-
ject to dismissal by federal judges.6 5 Consensual reference of a case to
a magistrate may be vacated by a district judge, either sua sponte or on
motion of the parties.6 6 In its conclusion, the Wharton-Thomas Court
noted four factors it had relied upon in holding the Federal Magistrates
Act constitutional. It noted:
1. the reference to a magistrate is consensual;
2. the district judge has the power to vacate the reference;
3. the magistrate is appointed by the district judges, is a
part of the district court, and is specially designated to
try cases, and
4. the parties have a right to appeal to a district judge or
the court of appeals. 7
4. Summary
The constitutionality of the Federal Magistrates Act has been
upheld by the U.S. Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue. The
Ninth Circuit relied upon both litigant consent and extensive administrative
control by the district courts. The Third Circuit relied primarily upon
litigant consent to uphold the Act.
It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit is correct in its analysis
that litigant consent does not resolve all the constitutional problems
with the Federal Magistrates Act. In addition to litigant consent, the
doctrine of separation of powers requires essential attributes of judicial
power be retained in an article III court. 6 8 Both Courts of Appeals noted
several factors in addition to litigant consent which keep essential
attributes in an article III court. These factors include:
65 Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. Sections 631(a) and 631(i) (1976 ed., Supp. v
1981).
66 Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(c)6.).
67 Id. at 930. It should be emphasized that the availability of appellate
review in an article III court does not in itself satisfy constitutional
requirements. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n. 39.
68 725 F.2d at 544 (en banc). "on its most fundamental plan the separation
of powers doctrine protects the whole constitutional structure by
requiring that each branch retain its essential powers and independence."
Id. (citing to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
Although this paper examines the unconstitutional delegation of adjudica-
tion by federal compulsory arbitration provisions, the constitutionality
of consensual arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act is not within
the scope of this paper.
1. the district judge has the power to vacate the reference
to a magistrate, and
2. magistrates are appointed by the district judge and are
subject to dismissal by district judges.
As the Ninth Circuit explained, attributes retained in an
article III court under the Magistrates Act protect the judiciary against
intervention by the executive or legislative branches of government.
69
Magistrates are not dependent upon loyalty to any officer of either of the
other branches of government. In sum, the Magistrates Act satisfied the
doctrine of separation of powers since it sufficiently protects the judiciary
from the encroachment of other branches of government.
70
IV. Federal Administrative Agencies
1. Introduction
Federal administrative agencies also perform adjudicatory
functions. 7 1 Administrative officers do not receive the fixed salary and
life tenure protections of article III. Thus, the Northern Pipeline
analysis has ramifications extending to administrative adjudication.
Two issues arise when the Northern Pipeline analysis is applied
to administrative adjudication. The first is whether administrative
agencies can without limit, constitutionally adjudicate public rights.
Second, is whether administrative agencies can constitutionally adjudicate
common law private rights.
2. Limitations on the Adjudication of Public
Rights by Administrative Agencies.
Northern Pipeline establishes that public rights may be adjudi-
cated at the determination of Congress, in a non-article Ill tribunal.
72
Article 1I, Due Process, and the doctrine of separation of powers place
very little limitation upon the adjudication of public rights by non-
article III tribunals.
a. Article III Limitation
The Northern Pipeline Court noted that judicial review of
administrative adjudication may be required by article III. The Court said:
69 Id. at 545.
70 Id. at 546.
71See generally Davis, Administrative Law Sections 8.01-8.13 (1972).
72 See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
"Moreover, when Congress assigns these matters Lpublic rights! to admini-
strative agencies, or to legislative courts, it has generally provided, and
we have suggested that it may be required to provide, for Article III
judicial review." 73 This position is in contradiction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Schweiker v. McClure,7 4 which upheld the adjudication of public
rights by private insurance carriers without any governmental review.75
b. Due Process Limitation
At issue in Schweiker was whether Congress could provide that
hearings on disputed claims for medicare payments were to be held by
private insurance carriers, without a right of appeal to a government
officer.76 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the adjudication of these public
rights by private insurance carriers.77 The Court stated that due process
73 458 U.S. 50, 70 n. 23 (citing to Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. at 455 n. 13).
74 456 U.S. 188 (1982). In Schweiker, the Supreme Court, two months before
it decided Northern Pipeline, upheld the adjudication of public rights
by private insurance carriers without any governmental review. Although
the Schweiker Court did not explicitly label the rights involved as
public rights, the rights were public rights. Rights related to public
benefits have traditionally been recognized as public rights. See Crowell,
285 U.S. at 51.
75 Id. at 189, 190. The medicare payments at issue were Part B supplemental
medical benefits. Id. In order to make the administration of the pro-
gram more efficient, Congress authorized the Secretary to contract with
private insurance carriers to administer the payment of Part B claims.
42 U.S.C. Section 1395 u (1976 and Supp. IV).
A rejected claimant has the right to have a carrier employee, other than
the initial decision maker, review the written record and affirm or adjust
the original determination. Id. at 191. If the amount in dispute is
$100 or more, a still dissatisfied claimant then has a right to an oral
hearing. Id. An officer chosen by the carrier, who has not yet participated
in the adjudication, presides over the hearing. Id. Neither the statute
nor the regulations make provisions for further review of the hearing
officer's decision. Id.
76 456 U.S. at 189.
77 456 U.S. at 200.
only required an impartial tribunal and a weighing of the costs and benefits
of imposing additional procedures.7
8
In evaluating whether the tribunal was impartial, the Court
explained that there is a rebuttable presumption that the tribunal is
impartial. 79 The Schwelker Court reasoned that since carriers paid all
claims from federal funds and since salaries of hearing officers were
paid by the federal government, there was no proof of financial interest
on the part of the carriers.80 Without proof of a financial interest on
the part of the carrier, there was no basis for assuming a derivative
bias among hearing officers. 8 1
The Schweiker Court applied the test it adopted in Mathews v.
Eldridge to weigh the costs and benefits of providing subsequent review
of a carrier's decision. The Mathews test establishes three factors
relevant to such an inquiry. These factors are:
I. first, the private interest that will be affected by
official actions
2. second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probative
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, and finally,
3. the Government's interest; including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.82
In applying the Mathews test, the Schweiker Court assumed the
first and third factors were met and focused on the second factor. 83 It
noted that insurance carriers are directed to select "qualified individuals"
78 Id. at 195, 198.
79 Id. at 195 (citing to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975);
U--nited States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)). The Court explained
that the presumption could be rebutted by a showing of conflict of
interest or some other specific reasons for disqualification. Id. The
burden of establishing a disqualifying interest costs on the party
making the assertion. Id. at 196.
80 Id. at 196.
81 Id. at 197
82 Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
83 456 U.S. at 198.
who have a "thorough knowledge of the Medicare program." 84 The Court
concluded that "appellees simply have not shown that the procedures
prescribed by Congress and the Secretary are not fair or that different
or additional procedures would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation
of Part B benefits." 85
The Schweiker Court upheld as constitutional the delegation of
adjudication of public rights by a private officer, without requiring
any judicial review of the private officer. It concluded that due
process did not require a right to appeal to a government official from
an insurance carrier's decision denying an award of medicare benefits.
c. Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress, itself,
from adjudicating public rights. As explained in Justice Powell's
opinion in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 86 a violation
of separation of powers occurs when one branch assumes a function that
more properly is entrusted to another. 87
In Chadha, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the legislative
veto of a decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.8 8
Justice Powell reasoned that the veto violated the doctrine of separation
of powers.
8 9
Justice Powell explained that by exercising the legislative
veto, the House assumed the functions of reviewing final agency action
which is ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts. He explained,
84 Id. at 199 (quoting Department of HEW, Medical Part B Carriers Manual,
ch. VII, p. 12-21 (1980)).
85 Id. at 200.
86 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983) (Powell J., concurring).
87 Id. at 2790. Justice Powell explained that the doctrine of separation
of powers may be violated in two ways. Id. First, a branch of govern-
ment may interfere with the other's performance of its constitutionally
assigned function. Id. Secondly, the doctrine may be violated when
one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another.
Id.
88 Id. at 2788. The majority relied primarily upon the Presentment Clause
and the bicameral requirement to hold the one-house veto of a decision
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service unconstitutional. Id. at
2787.
89 Id. at 2789.
"I/n my vlew, the legislative branch in effect acted as an appell'ate
court by overruling the Service's application of established law to
Chadha."9 0 He concluded that Congress violated separation of powers since
it assumed a function that the Constitution entrusted to the judiciary.91
Thus, Congress cannot vest In itself the adjudication of public
rights. Such adjudication by Congress would undercut the very principle
of separation of powers.
d. Summary
Although the doctrine of separation of powers prevents Congress
from reserving to itself the adjudication of public rights, there is
little restriction on the ability of Congress to delegate the adjudication
of public rights to administrative agencies. Although it has been suggested
that article III might require judicial review of adjudication of public
rights, the Supreme Court's decision in Schwelker undercuts that argument.
9 2
Schweiker also illustrates that due process places little restriction upon
the delegation of adjudication of public rights.
3. Adjudication of Common Law Private Rights
by Administrative Agencies.
a. Analysis
Northern Pipeline identified two subclasses of private rights.
First, congressionally created private rights, may be adjudicated by
adjuncts to article III courts so long as the limitations listed in
Crowell are Imposed upon the adjunct.9 3 Secondly, common law private
rights may be adjudicated by adjuncts to article III courts so long as
de novo review Is maintained by the article III court.9 4 Administrative
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce
Commission frequently adjudicate common law private rights. Administrative
90 Id. at 2791 n. 8. He added "/ a /nd unlike a court or an administrative
agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a hearing
before acting." Id.
91 Id. at 2791.
92 See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
93 458 U.S. at 78. Crowell concerned the liability of an employee to his
employee under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
94 Id. at 79. As an example of the adjudication of common law private
rights by an adjunct the Court noted U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667
(1980). See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text supra.
agency adjudication is not usually subject to de novo review9 5 and differs
from adjudication by Federal Magistrates.
Attributes which remain in an article III court when a magistrate
adjudicates an issue do not remain in the court when an administrative
agency adjudicates an issue.9 6 First, adjudication by an administrative
agency is not necessarily concensual. The exhaustion doctrine requires
adjudication before an agency. 9 7 Secondly, administrative officers are
not appointed or removed by article III judges.9 8 Third, an article III
judge cannot sua sponte, remove a case from an administrative agency.
De novo review of administrative agencies is the exception rather
than the rLeT.9 Equivalents to de novo review which upheld the Magistrates
Act are not present in administrative adjudication. Thus, adjudication
of common law private rights by administrative agencies is unconstitutional.
95 Various findings of administrative agencies are subject to various
standards of review. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 5 U.S.C.
Section 706(2)c. Findings of facts are upheld if there is substantial
evidence to support the finding. 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)E. Determina-
tions of policy are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious/abuse
of discretion standard. 5 U.S.C. Section 70(6)(2)A.
96 The attributes which remain in an article III court are listed in the
text accompanying note 67 supra.
97 The exhaustion doctrine requires that a litigant exhaust his admini-
strative remedy before he is entitled to judicial relief. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51. See, e.g., Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 406 U.S. 320 (1972) and notes 115-128
and accompanying text infra. For a general discussion of the exhaustion
doctrine see generally Davis, Administrative Law Sections 20.01-20.10
(1972).
98 In contrast to federal magistrates who are appointed by article III
judges, administrators of federal agencies are generally appointed
by the executive branch. See generally Schwartz, Administrative Law
Section 6 (1976).
99 See note 92 supra.
b. Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.)
The I.C.C. is an example of an administrative agency unconsti-
tutionally adjudicating common law private claims. In addition to other
disputes, the I.C.C. adjudicates contract-rate disputes between Individuals
and railroads.lO0 Although much of its adjudication involves public
rights, the I.C.C. cannot constitutionally adjudicate private rights.
The Northern Pipeline Court noted that although bankruptcy itself may be
a public right, bankruptcy judges could not annex to that right, the
adjudication of private rights. 10 1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has taken a
different view in its recent decision in Detroit, Toledo and Ironton Rail-
road Co. and Grand Trunk Western Railroad v. Consolidated Rail Corporation
(DTI/GTW v. Conrail. DTI/GTW filed suit against Conrail seeking an
injunction to prevent an alleged breach of contract by Conrail. Conrail
proposed to cancel certain joint rates, allegedly in violation of its
contract with DTI/GTW. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
the Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint and held that jurisdiction
belonged to the I.C.C.102
The Court of Appeals rejected DTI/GTW's argument that adjudication
by the I.C.C. was an unlawful delegation of adjudication of private rights.
The court reasoned that DTI/GTW's argument "assumes that the controversy
in this case concerns private contractual rights only."1 0 3 The Court
labeled the entire controversy as involving public rights and held ''the
plenary control of the I.C.C. over rail rates appears clearly to bring
tarriff disputes wi.thin the definition of public rights controversies."10 4
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals rationale has already
been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline. 10 5 The
100 See Guandolo, Transportation Regulation, at 299 (1972).
101 458 U.S. at 71. The Court explained that the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations may well be a public right but it must be distinguished
from the right to recover contract damages which is obviously a private
right. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the authority of
Congress to adjudicate bankruptcies carried with it an inherent power
to adjudicate bankruptcy-related controversies. Id. at 72.
102 DTI/GTW v. Conrail, No. 82-1890, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1984).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prohibits a court from exercis-
ing jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the Court. See generally Davis, Administrative Law Sections
19.01-19.06 (1972).
103 DTI/GTW v. Conrail, No. 82-1890, slip op. at 6.
104 Id.
105 See note 101 supra.
DTI/GTW Court threw a blanket label on the entire controversy and ignored
individual issues. Because a controversy may involve some public rights
doesn't give the court jurisdiction over private right issues. The
Northern Pipeline Court noted that bankruptcy itself may be a public right,
but that did not make constitutional the adjudication of private contract
issues.106
It is further submitted that the contract issue in DTI/GTW was
common law private right, just as the contract issue ,in Northern Pipeline. 10 7
public rights involve at a minimum the government as a party. The govern-
ment was not a party to this action.l08 DTI/GTW involved a contract action
any one individual against another; therefore, common law private rights.
The adjudication of a common law private right by an adjunct
requires the adjunct's finding be reviewed de novo. An article Ill court
does not have general de novo review over the I.C.109 Nor is there any
eluivalent of de novo review maintained by the district court over the
,C.C.Il0 Thus, adjudication of common law private rights by the I.C.C.
as unconstitutional.
I06 Id.
107 In Northern Pipeline, Northern sued Marathon for an alleged breach
of contract. 456 U.S. at 87. Here DTI seeks an injunction against
Conrail to prevent Conrail from breaching its contract. DTI/GTW v.
Conrail, slip op. at 1, 2.
108 See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra. And even if the issue
here could be characterized as a federally created right, delegation
would be unconstitutional since I.C.C. orders are enforceable without
an article III court so determining. See list of attributes in text
accompanying note 29 supra.
109 The standard of review of a finding of an administrative agency will
depend upon the issue under review. See note 95 supra.
110 The equivalents of de novo review noted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals
are not present. In addition to the ability of an article III judge
to appoint or remove a magistrate, an article III judge can remove
a case from a magistrate's consideration. See notes 34-70 and accompany-
ing text supra. Article III judges cannot remove or appoint admini-
strators. Nor can a dispute be removed from an agency's consideration.
4. Adjudication of Common Law Private
Rights by Compulsory Arbitration
a. Introduction
Compulsory arbitration has been looked to as an alternative to
administrative adjudication, I Il and has been utilized to adjudicate
common law private rights. Arbitration is conducted by an arbitrator who
does not have life tenure or a fixed salary.ll2 Since compulsory arbitra-
tion is non-consensuaI and judicial review of arbitrator's decisions is
almost non-existent, 113 delegation of adjudiation of common law private
rights to arbitrators is unconstitutional.'
b. Railway Labor Act 1 15
Section 153 of the Railway Labor Act requires arbitration of
disputes between an employee and a carrier growing out of "agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions."11 6 The arbitration
is conducted by the Adjustment Board.f17 The Board is exempt from the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.11 8 Decisions
of the Board are virtually immune from judicial review, since review is
limited to fraud or lack of jurisdiction. 119
In the 1972 case of Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co., 120 an employee, claiming he was wrongfully discharged from his employ-
ment by the railroad, filed suit against the railroad. The federal
111 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
112 Article III requires judicial power be vested in officers with life
tenure and salary protection. See note 2 supra.
113 Arbitration provisions provide for little judicial review. For example,
the Railway Labor Act provides for review only for fraud or lack of
jurisdiction. 45 U.S.C. Section 153(p).
114 Northern Pipeline established that common law private rights may be
adjudicated by adjuncts if de novo review is provided by the article III
court. See notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
115 45 U.S. C. Sections 151-188 (1981).
116 Id. at Section 153.
117 Id.
118 5 U.S.C. Section 551(1).
119 45 U.S.C. Section 153(p).
120 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
district court dismissed the complaint for plaintiff's failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies under Section 153 of the Railway Labor Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the federal court.121
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 153 was the only
remedy available to the aggrieved party. 122 The Court explained that
since the only source of the plaintiff's right not to be discharged
was the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
union, 12 3 the claim fell subject to the Act's requirement that it be
submitted to the Adjustment Board.12 4 The Court did not consider consti-
tutional questions not raised by either party.1 2 5 The dissent was not
as restrained. It characterized the issue as a common law private right
with a constitutional right to be adjudicated in a court before a jury.12
6
It is submitted that adjudication by the Adjustment Board of a
wrongful discharge claim under Section 153 of the Railway Labor Act is
unconstitutional. A wrongful discharge claim is a common law private
right. 12 7 The adjudication of a common law private right by an adjunct
is permissible only if an article III court has de novo review of the
adjunct's findings. Decisions of2 he Adjustment Board are virtually
exempt from any judicial review.
121 Id. at 320, 321.
122 Id. at 325.
123 Id. at 324. It was conceded by both parties that the only basis of
the wrongful discharge claim was the collective bargaining contract.
Id. With.the expansion of the law of wrongful discharge such a
concession is unlikely to be made. For a discussion of the law of
wrongful discharge see Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice
(1984).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 324-325 (citing to Rule 23(0)(C) and Mazur v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 206 n. 5 (1954)). The majority criticized the dissent for reach-
ing the issue of a Seventh Amendement right to a jury. Neither party
had argued the issue. Id.
126 Id. at 330, 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127 It has been argued that a collective bargaining agreement is really
a congressionally created right because it is enforceable only because
of a statute. For a discussion of the nature of a collective bargain-
ing agreement see D. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement, 61 California Law Review 663 (1973). Even if the issue
of wrongful discharge is a congressionally created right, the lack of
any judicial review of the decision of the Adjustment Board would still
invalidate the delegation under the Crowell attributes listed in note 29
and accompanying text supra.
128 See note 110 supra.
c. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
129
Each application for the registration of a pesticide is required
to file certain information and testing data in support of its application
for registration. 130 Section 136(a) ID authorizes the Administrator to
use information, research and test results submitted by a previous appli-
cation for registration after 1969, to support a subsequent application.
The Administrator is authorized to use the information only if the
subsequent applicant has offered to compensate the original submitter.
Disputes as to compensation are submitted to binding arbitration, to be
conducted by an arbitrator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. 13 1 An original submitter who refuses to participate in the
arbitration proceeding forfeits the right to compensation. Conclusions of
the arbitrator as to the amount of compensation are unreviewable by any
court absent fraud or misrepresentation.
132
It has been argued that this adjudication by an arbitrator of
property rights in information and test results given the EPA, is an
unconstitutional delegation of adjudication of common law private rights.
Two U.S. District Courts 1 33 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
have considered the argument. The two District Courts concluded that
such delegation is unconstitutional under Northern Pipeline. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the delegation constitutional,
since there exists no property rights.13
4
In Union Carbide Argricultural Product Co. v. Ruckleshaus, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, concluded
that the arbitration provision was unconstitutional.13 5 The court explained,
". . . what is dispositive here is the fact that the proposed arbitration
procedure commits to arbitrators the power to resolve valuation issues
without judicial review."13 6
129 7 U.S.C. Section 136a (1982).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 571 F. Supp.
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), Monsanto Comp. v. Acting Administrator, United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Missouri 1983).
134 Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419 (3rd Cir. 1982);
Chevron Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1981). Both
decisions of the Third Circuit were made before Northern Pipeline.
Therefore, neither of them took into account the analysis of Northern
Pipeline.
135 571 F. Supp. at 124.
136 Id.
The court looked to Northern Pipeline and found that the essential
attributes of judicial power were not retained in an article III court.
In accord with Union Carbide is Monsanto Co. v. Acting Admini-
strator, United States Environmental Protection Agency. In Monsanto,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri also held that
"the arbitration scheme . . . delegates judicial power to determine
property right disputes without the necessary prerequisites of Article III
of the Constitution."137
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Mobay Chemical Corporation v. Gorsuch, reaffirmed its holding in
Chevron Chemical Company v. Costle.138 The Mobay court held that an
applicant does not have a property interest in data submitted to the
Environmental Protection Agency. The court reasoned that since there was
no property interest, the compulsory arbitration provisions did not
deprive the original submitters of the right to a judicial determination
of just compensation.139
It is submitted that the Mobay court mischaracterized what was
at issue. The issue was whether litigants have a right to adjudicate
their dispute in an article III court. It is further submitted that this
property right is a common law private right.1 40 As a common law private
right, it may be adjudicated by an adjunct, so long as de novo review by
137 564 F. Supp. at 567, jur. noted Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct.
230 (1983).
138 682 F. 2d at 422. The Mobay panel was bound by its decision in Chevron.
Third Circuit, Internal Operation, Procedures Ch. VIIIC (1980). The
Mobay panel explained "moreover, the arguments advanced in this appeal
fail to convince us that Chevron should be reconsidered by the court
en banc." 682 F.2d at 422.
139 Id. at 422.
140 The property right involved here is not a public right since the deter-
mination of just compensation is inherently a judicial inquiry which
neither Congress or the Executive may assume. See United States v.
New River Cullieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343-44 (923); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
Even if the property right here could be characterized as a congressionally
created private right, the delegation is still unconstituional since
the lack of judicial review would not meet the Crowell attributes test.
See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
a district court is provided. 14 1 Since review by a district court is
limited under the Act to fraud or misrepresentation, the arbitration is
unconstitutional.
d. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)I4 2
The constitutionality of the compulsory arbitration provision
of Section 1401 of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980
(MPPAA) of ERISA is also at issue. Section 1401 requires disputes
between an employer and the plan sponsor concerning withdrawal liability
be resolved through arbitration.
The MPPAA was enacted in response to Congress' concern that the
large multiemployer pension plans were often under-funded and that
employers, knowing that the plans were under-funded, had incentive to
withdraw from the plans early to avoid liability. The MPPAA was designed
to discourage early withdrawals by imposing liability on withdrawing
employers immediately upon withdrawal from the plan, for the employer's
proportionate share of the unfunded vested liabilities.
The constitutionality of the arbitration provision was at issue
in Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.1 4 3 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim of Peick that the
arbitration provision abridged his right of "access to courts". 14 4 The
court further explained that there was no deprivation of a Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury since what was being adjudicated was a public right.1 4 5
141 It has been argued that the requirement of de novo review could be
satisfied if a separate cause of action existed for the taking of
property, under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. Section 1491 (Supp. V 1981).
For a discussion of why such a remedy is not available see Brief of
Appellee Monsanto Company at 40-45, Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator,
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552
(E.D. Missouri 1983) jur. noted Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct.
230 (1983).
142 29 U.S.C. Section 1401 (Supp. V. 1981).
143 Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, No. 82-2081, slip op.
(7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983). Petition for cert. filed 52 U.S.L.W.
3583 (1984) (No. 83-1246).
144 Id. at 3.
145 Id. The Northern Pipeline court analogized its distinction between
public and private rights for the purpose of article III to the public
and private rights distinction used to determine the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial. 458 U.S. at 70 (citing to Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 456 (1977).
It is submitted that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was incorrect in characterizing the issue of withdrawal liability
as a public right, although the Court was correct in upholding the
constitutionality of Section 1401. Disputes over withdrawal liability
concern congressionally created private rights.1 46 The enforcement of
pension funds has long been considered a matter of private rights.1 4 7
Under the Northern Pipeline analysis, adjudication of congressionally
created private rights can be delegated to an adjunct so long as only
the attributes listed in Crowell are delegated.148 The issue of judicial
review is of primary concern here. The decision of the adjunct must be
subjected to a standard of review less deferential than a "clearly erroneous"
standard.
Section 1401(c) of the MPPAA gives the findings of an arbitrator
a rebuttable presumption of being correct.1 49 Such a presumption, is
less deferential than a ''clearly erroneous" standard of review, 150 and
therefore, meets the Northern Pipeline requirements for the delegation
of the adjudication of congressionally created private rights.
V. Conclusion
Northern Pi eline has established an analysis to determine
whether a particular delegation of judicial power to a non-article III
officer is constitutional. Public rights may be adjudicated by non-
article III officers. Private rights must be adjudicated in an article III
146 The adjudication of withdrawal liability does not involve a public
right since the United States will not always be a party to such an
action. The presence of the United States in a suit is necessary
before a disputed right may be characterized as a public right. See
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69.
147 See 60 Am.Jur. 2d Pensions and Retirement Funds Section 74 (1972).
148 See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
149 29 U.S.C. Section 1401(c) (Supp V. 1981).
150 The rebuttable presumption of Section 140l(c) is also clearly less
deferential than the virtual lack of review given an arbitrator's
decision under the Railway Labor Act and FIFRA.
court although they may also be adjudicated by adjuncts to article III
courts. Common law private rights may be adjudicated by an adjunct to
an article III court so long as the article III court has de novo review
over the findings of the adjunct.
The Federal Magistrates Act has been upheld as constitutional
by the U.S. Courts of Appeals which have considered it. Litigant consent
and extensive administrative control over the adjudication by magistrates,
has been held to be the equivalent of de novo review.
When administrative officers or arbitrators are used to resolve
a dispute of common law private rights, their decisions are generally
not reviewed de novo.151 Nor is any equivalent of de novo review present.
First, compulsory arbitration is non-consensual. Secondly, administrative
officers and arbitrators are not appointed or removed by an article III
judge. Third, cases before the agency or arbitrator cannot be removed
by an article III judge.
The Railway Labor Act and FIFRA compulsory arbitration provisions
have been used to resolve contract and property right disputes. Resolution
of these common law private rights by compulsory arbitration is unconstitu-
tional. De novo review of the arbitrator's decision must be provided by
an article III court.
It is submitted that at a minimum, a less deferential standard
of review be given to an arbitrator's findings under the Railway Labor Act
and FIFRA. A standard of review analogous to that given an arbitrator's
findings under the MPPAA, may save the compulsory arbitration provisions.
The issue remains as to whether the article III requirements will be met
by anything short of de novo review of an arbitrator's determination of
common law private rights.
151 To satisfy the requirement of de novo review, a separate cause of
action in addition to compulsory arbitration, could be recognized.
For a wrongful discharge claim under the Railway Labor Act, one
should be able to maintain a cause of action in tort or contract,
or an action under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
Suits for the taking of property without just compensation under
FIFRA should be able to be maintained under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C.
Section 1491 (Supp. V. 1981). See note 141 supra.
